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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FRANCES E. BERNARD,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
Case No.

vs.

16895

JOHN W. ATTEBURY,
Defendant and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff brought this action under the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act seeking support for her two minor children
pursuant to a 1976 Wyoming divorce decree.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
1.

That defendant pay to plaintiff the sum of $150 per

month for the support of John Joseph Attebury the said support to
commence on June 1, 1979.
2.

That defendant pay to plaintiff the sum of $150 per month

for the support of John David Attebury commencing August 1, 1979 through
November 1, 1979 when the said minor child turns eighteen (18) years
of age for a total amount due of $600.
3.

That defendant owes to plaintiff the sum of $2,000 as

arrearages for the two (2) minor children of the parties computed as
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follows:

$250 per month for each of the minor children of the partie

for the months of February through May of 1979 for a total of $2,000
arrearages.

The Court entering this Order waived support money for

John David Attebury for the months of June and July of 1979 because
of his employment during those months.
4.

.That the defense of res judicata, specifically that

the Order of May 31, 19 79 was res judicata as to the arrearages award:
in the Judgment and Order of September 5, 1979, be and the same is
hereby determined to be not established, and that the Motion of
defendant objecting to the Order of September 5, 1979 be and the
same is hereby overruled.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

L

That all support ordered for John David Attebury be

2.

That the support order for John David Attebury and Jahr

reviewed.

Joseph Attebury be modified to the extent that their stepfather is
obligated to provide support and in fact, did provide support.
3.

That the judgment for arrearages be reversed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

.

Plaintiff divorced defendant on September 7, 1976, in the

.....

District Court for Sweetwater County, State of Wyoming, and was awar
ed custody of the two minor children of the parties, to-wit:
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John

·~

David Attebury, d/o/b 11-30-61 and John Joseph Attebury, d/o/b
8-15-64 (R. 7) .

Defendant was not represented by counsel and a

support order for the said minor children in the sum of $500.00 per
month was entered (R. 7).
John David Attebury, hereinafter called John David, dropped
out of school in the fall of

1976 (T. 94).

In the fall of 1977

John David went to Idaho Falls, Idaho and secured employment as a
prep man for Ace Hansen Chevrolet (T. 70).

In March of 1978, John

David came to Salt Lake City where he resided with defendant through
December 8, 1978 (T. 70).

In October of 1977 John Joseph Attebury,

hereinafter called John Joseph, came to Salt Lake City to reside with
defendant (T.

69~77).

John Joseph lived with and was supported by

defendant and attended school through December 8, 1978 (T. 69).

John

David would not attend school in Salt Lake City and went to work as a
laborer for the BLM at the minimum wage (T. 70).

Defendant purchased

an El Camino and automobile insurance for John David and advanced monies
to him which were repaid in part from John David's earnings at the BLM

(T. 71).

On November 29, 1978, plaintiff came to Salt Lake City, and

established contact with John David and John Joseph (T. 78).

On Decembe.

7, 1978, plaintiff resumed custody of John David and John Joseph and
immediately applied for
them (T. 79).

pub~ic

assistance from the State of Utah for

Plaintiff, in fact, received public assistance from the

State of Utah for John David and John Jospeh for the month of December,
1978 and January, 1979 (T. 80).
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On December 9, 1978, John David and John Joseph were requir
to return to Green River, Wyoming by themselves with plaintiff
to Green River on January 1, 1979 (T. 80).

return~:

Both boys have lived con- ;

tinuously with plaintiff in Green River, Wyoming from January l, 1979:::
to the date of the hearing (T. 81).

From December 9, 1978 to January

1979, John David and John Joseph resided temporarily with friends in :::

Green River, Wyoming, until plaintiff was able to return (T. 79, 80, ;·
On January 22, 1979, plaintiff married Willy Bernard in
Swee_twater County Clerk's Office (T. 81, 82).

Mr.

the~

Bernard purchased.:

a mobile home.for plaintiff and the two boys (T. 82) and was employed

,J..

as a "railroader" (T. 86).

Plaintiff provided support for John Davia:.:

and John Joseph (T. 82; 86) •
David and John

Jos~ph

Mr. Bernard provided support for John

...

··

(T. 82; 86) and in fact provided John David witl

a 1966 Dodge Pickup truck for his personal use (T. 92).
After John David left Salt Lake City on December 9, 1978
to take up residence in Green River, Wyoming, he first worked at
Covey's Little America from December 15, 1978 to January 17, 1979
(T. 83) where he earned $3.25 per hour (T. 88).

~c

Sometime between

January 1979 and May, 1979, John David worked for Bill Robins install
ing the skirting at the bottom of mobile homes for 25¢ a foot (T. 83,

'•

~

88, 89) •

John David kept his own earnings during this period of time

but on occasion bought groceries for plaintiff (T. 84) and helped to
buy his brother's glasses (T.

85).

In May of 1979, Mr. Bernard, who was a railroad foreman,
secured employment for John David working on the railroad working on
derailments (T. 83; 91).

John David worked for 'a day or so at a time'
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and made $100 on one such occasion (T. 91).

Between February and

May of 1979 John David also worked for a month for the Oil Repair
Service at Reliance, Wyoming for between $3 and $5 per hour (T. 96, 96).
In June of 1979 John David went to work

as a truck driver

for Jackman Refuse at a salary of $800 per month (T. 84; 89} and could
have earned as much as $1,600 (T. 90) although he could not remember
exactly how long he worked for Jackman Refuse (T. 91) even though

it was but a few weeks before the hearing (T. 90).
John David

next worked for the Burns Detective Agency in

August of 1979 (T. 84) earning $4#77 per hour and apparently worked
for them

up until a few days before the hearing (T. 90).
During all of these employments

John David kept his own

salary and used it for his own expenses and personal debts (T. 84);
did not pay rent (T. 91); on occasion bought groceries for plaintiff
(T. 84; 92) and helped buy his brother's glasses (T.

85).

He was

engaged to be married but not until he turned 18 and could "get a job"
(T.

91).
On March 21, 1979, plaintiff filed a petition for support

under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act claiming
support from December 1, 1978.

An Order to Show Cause was issued and

service was accepted by defendant's attorney pursuant to agreement
with plaintiff's attorney (R. 9, 10).
At this point an agreement was entered into by and between
Deputy County Attorney Marcus Theodore, Dennis Kroll and the attorney
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for defendant, stipulating for a reduction in the support money from
$500 to $300 per month with $150 being paid to John Joseph effective
immediately but with certain restrictions with reference to the payment to John David Attebury (T. 73).

This agreement was supposed to

have been reduced to writing in the order of May 30, 1979 (R. 11, 12).
A stipulation correcting the order to what i t should have been was pre
pared by defendant's counsel and executed by counsel on July 2, 1979

(R. 19)

A corrected order effective as of May 30, 1979 was signed

by Judge Dee on August 22, 1979, but to, correct the erroneous order
entered on June 8, 1979.
The issue of res judicata was raised at this time and was
specifically reserved by the court in the minute entry (R. 16) , and
at (T. 56-59) and in fact on the judgment and order entered on
August 22, 1979 (R. 18).
On September 5, 1979, a judgment and order was entered
reflecting the decision of the court as a result of the hearing on
August 22, 1979 (R. 20).

Objection was taken to this judgment and

order by defendant (R. 22) and on November 29, 1979, a new petition
and order to show cause was issued against defendant (R. 24).

A

hearing was set for January 16, 1980 and on this date a hearing was
held

~n

the question of res judicata (T. 44-53) -and resulted in the

consolidated order of January 16, 1980 signed by Judge Uno (R. 40, 41):
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING
SUPPORT FOR JOHN DAVID ATTEBURY UNDER THE UNIFORM
RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT.
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, hereafter URESA, is a statute whose purpose is to provide a mechanism
to enforce a duty of support in a foreign jurisdiction by someone
who has a right to support.

If a legal duty is found, the amount of

support ordered under URESA by the trial court is discretionary.

The

trial court should judge the amount to be ordered independently based
upon the ability of the obliger to pay and the need of the obligee
to receive support.
The Wyoming URESA gives jurisdiction to decide the issue
of support to the Utah courts.

The Wyoming statute states:

"Duties of support applicable under this Act
are those imposed or impossible under the laws
of any state where the obliger was present for
the period during which support is sought.
The
obliger is presumed to have been present in the
responding state during the period for which
support is sought until otherwise shown."
Wyoming Statute 20-111 1957 as Amended, 1973
Cum. Supplement.
In the instant case, the obliger, herein the defendant,
has been present in Utah during the period in which support is being
sought.

Utah, as the responding state, must therefore apply its laws.

In Thompson v. Kite, 214 Kansas 700, 522 P.2d 327 (1974), the
Supreme Court of Kansas stated:
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care of both himself and his brother.

There doesn't seem to be any

reason not to assume that he would be able to continue to work and
support himself until he reaches 18.
of oneself, he is.

If anyone is able to take care

John David Attebury :..s also receiving support

from his stepfather (who has a duty to provide i t under Utah law) and
mother, thus showing the lack of need of any support money.
POINT II
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM RECOVERING CHILD SUPPORT
BECAUSE SUCH SUPPORT WAS ALREADY BEING PROVIDED Ai.~D
SHE IS NOT REQUESTING REIMBURSEV.lENT
The basic right of a child to support is unquestioned.

In

the instant case, however, John David Attebury was being fully support-,.
ed by his mother, his stepfather, and himself.
The contention of plaintiff that John David Attebury is
also entitled to be supported by defendant for the same period is
contrary to the case of Wasescha v. Wasescha, Utah 548 P.2d 895 {1976).
In that case the court held that where the children were supported by
the mother and her second husband and where she was not seeking reimbursement but rather was planning to place all the sums in trust
for the future of the children, that the husband was not obligated to
provide double support.

The court said:

"There is no prayer for reimbursement for past
support under such conditions, but there seems
to be an admission that the children's right to
support amply was supplied by someone, ~hich would
eliminate their claim for support, or, if you please,
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double support, and which admission would seem to
be an abandonment of a parent's claim for reimbursement, and certainly an estoppel to assent an antiethical claim for past child support, - unless a
case were instituted refutedly to assert the children's right to support, which, of course, is theirs,
but seems not to be the case extant here."
Similarly in the instant case there is no prayer for reimbursement and John David Attebury was clearly, under the testimony of
his mother, being supported by his mother, stepfather and to a large
extent, by himself.

Defendant should not also be required to support

John David Attebury for that same period of time and the order requiring him to do so is an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court.

In Carter v. Carter, 19 Utah 2d 183, 429 P.2d 35, 36 (1967),

this court stated:
"When the child becomes self-supporting or ceases
to be a minor the court will make such an order
regarding the distribution of the property as
shall be reasonable and proper."
POINT III
JOHN DAVID ATTEBURY IS AN EMANCIPATED CHILD
ENTITLED TO SUPPORT

Al.~D

IS NOT

There are no guides under Utah law regarding the determination of whether a child is emancipated.

The only Utah case dealing

with emancipation in any way is Sparks v. Hinckley, 78 Utah 502, 5 P.2d
570 (1931) which is not applicable to the case at hand.
In Sparks, the child claimed that wages earned had been
given to his aunt, with whom he was residing, for purposes of investment by her for him.

This court held that the aunt standing in loco

parents to the child_and was entitled to the wages and earnings of
stated that merely reaching the age of
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majority did not ipso facto terminate the relationship and emancipate
the child.
The Sparks case talks about emancipation and that it does
not occur automatically, but does not give any quidline as to when
it does occur or what factors are to be considered in determining
whether or not there has been an emancipation.

Also in Sparks, the

plaintiff was asking for his money back because he was an emancipated
child, in the instant case the appellant is claiming that his child
is emancipated, thus there is no need for him to support the child.
The power to emancipate a minor resides in the parents who
have a duty to support the child.

The parents intentions control,

Frevig v. Frevig, 90 New Mexico 51, 559 P.2d 839 (1977).

The inten-

tions of the parents may be implied from the conduct of the parents and
the surrounding circumstances.

In re Marriage of Weisbart, Colorado

564 P.2d 961 (1977).
In the case of Frevig v. Frevig, supra, the New Mexico
Supreme Court held:

"An express emancipation of a minor takes place
when a parent freely and voluntarily agrees with
his child, who is able to care and provide for
himself, that he may leave home, earn his own
living, and do as he pleases within his earnings."
In the instant case, John David Attebury, was free to do
as he wished.

Neither parent placed any restrictions upon him.

He

was able to care and provide for himself and the record is replete
with evidence of this proposition.

This is proven by the fact that
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he was employed in Twin Falls, Idaho, and in Salt Lake City, Utah.
on a full time basis.
This court should find John David Attebury emancipated
as of October 1977, the time he began living and earning his own
living, and the he is not entitled to su~port from defendant.
POINT IV
JOHN DAVID ATTEBURY &.~D JOHN JOSEPH ATTEBURY ARE NOT
ENTITLED TO SUPPORT FROM APPELLANT SINCE MAY 8, 1979
BECAUSE OF BEING SUPPORTED BY THEIR STEPFATHER
In 1979 the Utah Legislature amended Utah's laws concerning
support.

They enacted section 78-45-4.1 and 78-45-4.2 of the Code.
78-45-4.1 provides:
"A stepparent shall support a stepchild to the
same extent that a natural or adoptive parent
is required to support a child. Provided, however, that upon termination of the marriage or
common law relationship between the stepparent
and the child's natural or adoptive parent or
in cases where there is a filed pending divorce
action with separation or a legal separation
between the stepparent and the child's natural
parent, the support obligation shall be as if
the marriage had never taken place."
The statute seems to clearly state the the stepparent,

during the marriage, is the one responsible for the support of his
stepchildren.

The duty of support of the natural parent only comes

back into active existence if there is

a

divorce or a separation

with a filed divorce pending between the stepparent and the natural
parent.

The stepfather in the instant case has provided support

for his stepchildren.

He has provided with a trailer home to live

in, a motor vehicle, as well as other necessities.

...

The stepfather
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by these actions, has relieved the natural father of any active duty
to support his children.
78-45-4.2 provides:
"Nothing contained herein shall act to relieve
the natural parent of adoptive parent of the
primary obligation of support, furthermore, a
stepparent has the same right to recover support
for a stepchild from the natural or adoptive
parent as any other obligee."
This section does not relieve the stepfather of the active duty to
support his stepchildren.

It also does not require the natural parent

to pay support to the child if the stepfather is doing so, but it

does require the natural father to pay support for his children if therd
is a need for it.
These sections of the Utah Code Annotated are very vague
and unclear as to their meaning and purpose.

Since they are subject

to many interpretations there is a need for judicial review of them to ··
guide both the bench and the bar.
Since the stepfather is still married to the mother at the
time of these proceedings, the natural father should be relieved of
any active duty to support his children until there is a need for him
to do so.
POINT V
APPELLANT IS NOT OBLIGATED TO PAY FOR ARREARAGES FOR
EITHER JOHN DAVID ATTEBURY OR JOHN JOSEPH ATTEBURY BECAUSE THE COURT ORDER OF MAY 31, 1979 IS RES JUDICATA
AS TO THESE SUMS
The URESA grants to the Utah courts the jurisdiction over
the issue of arrearages.

In Wyoming Statutes 20-113, 1957 as amended

1973 Cum. Supplement it states:
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"All duties of support, including the duty to pay
are enforceable by a proceeding under
this act."
arrearage~

The URESA also gives Utah the duty of applying its laws
to all matters concerning support under this Act by its choice of
law section (Wyoming Statutes 20-111, 1957, as amended, 1973 Cum.
Supplement).

Therefore, we must look at Utah law to decide the issue

of res judicata.
Res judicata is a doctrine by which a final judgment of a
court of competitive jurisdiction is conclusive upon the parties in
all subsequent litigation, involving the same cause of action.

This

is to avoid duplication and the possibility of subjecting a party to
multiple law suits that could result in an unjust result.
The case of East Millcreek Water Comoanv v. Salt Lake City,
108 Utah 315, 159 P.2d 863 (1945)

is dispositive on this issue.

Utah Supreme Court stated:
" . . . there are two kinds of cases where
res judicata is applied: In the one the
former action is an absolute bar to the
maintenance of the second; it usually bars
the successful party as well as the loser,
it must be between the same parties or their
privies, it applies not only to points and
issues which are actually raised and decided
herein, but also to such as could have been
therein adjudicated, but it only applies to
where to claim, demand or cause of action is
the same in both cases."
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The

further it states:
"
. if one of the parties fails to raise
any point or issue or to litigate any part of
his claim, demand or cause of action and the
matter goes to final judgment, such party
may not again litigate that claim, demand or
cause of action or any issue, point or part
thereof which he could have but failed to
litigate in the former action." East Millcreek
Water Company v. Salt Lake City, 108 Utah 315
159 P.2d 863 at 866 (1947)
In the instant case there was a 0ourt

~rder

dated May 31,

1979 in which the same parties to the August 22, 1979 order were
involved.

This court order referred to future support for the

children and no reference was made to past support.
an opportunity to be heard.

Both sides had

If we follow the holding of East Millcreek

Water Company v. Salt Lake City, supra, the respondent is unable to
claim any past support.

The doctrine of res judicata, by the holding

of this case, can be applied to all points and issues that could have
been therein adjudicated.

Respondent was able to have the issue of

arrearages adjudicated at the May 31, 1979 hearing if she desired, but
failed to press the issue.
May 31st

The issue of arrearages was present at the

hearing, some past support was due at that time.
Therefore, since this was a subsequent claim the arrearages

at the August 22nd hearing, before a court of competent jurisdiction,
between the same parties which involved the same cause of action for
support and the respondent had an opportunity to adjudicate the issue
of arrearages if she desired, but she did not do so, this claim for
past support can't be upheld because the matter is res judicata.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant is entitled to relief from all orders of
support based on this record.
Respectfully submitted,

Wendell P. Ables
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
Suite 14, Intrade Building
1399 South Seventh East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of August, 1980,

I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief, postage
prepaid, to Sandra H. Peuler, Deputy County Attorney, attorney for
plaintiff, 243 East 400 South, Lower Level, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
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